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ABSTRACT
This thesis aims to illustrate the current legal and financial structures
being used in Mexico for the development of infrastructure projects.
For this purpose an ongoing project in Northwestern Mexico is
described and analyzed.
Huites hydroelectric dam is a project being built in the state of
Sonora in Northwest Mexico. Once completed, the project will bring
various benefits in the agricultural, electricity generation and flood
control areas.
The project is being financed through a public-private partnership in
which, as will be shown, the bulk of the risk is borne by the Mexican
government. Even though the intention of the government was to
finance the project with a larger private sector stake, it had no
choice but to guarantee both a bond issue and foreign credits. The
lack of choice, as is explored in the thesis, was due to the non-
existence of a private market for electricity in Mexico.
The thesis will describe the project giving enough background to
understand why it became a reality at the present time, it will
examine several privatization options for the state run electricity
monopoly as well as the financial and legal structures that are being
used to develop Huites.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Fred Moavenzadeh
Title: Director, Center for Construction Research
and Education and George Macomber
Professor of Construction Engineering and
Management
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1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to describe and analyze current
practice in financing the development of infrastructure in Mexico.
For such purpose, a characteristic project is examined. Huites
hydroelectric dam is presently under construction in the state of
Sinaloa in northwestern Mexico. Huites presents a rich example due
to its size, complexity and the type of benefits it is expected to
provide.
In order to understand why Huites became a reality at this time,
it is essential to look at the economic development of the country.
Such progress, after years of economic recession, gave rise to the
change in government policy towards public - private partnerships for
infrastructure development. The new policy came into effect with the
highway program of president Carlos Salinas de Gortari. The scheme
for the construction of Huites is a direct extrapolation of the
experience gained in the highway program.
This thesis is divided in six chapters. The first chapter is an
introduction to the work. Chapter two deals with Mexican economic
background, the Highway Development Program of the current
Mexican administration and the introduction of the Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) system all necessary concepts to understand why the
Huites project was structured as it is.
Chapter three deals with the description of Huites hydroelectric
dam. It begins with a description of the area where the project is 
located followed by the development of the project, a description of
the different elements that make up the project, a summary of how
the project is being executed including the progress that has been
8
achieved so far. Finally, the benefits that Huites is expected to bring
as well as the environmental impacts are analyzed.
Chapter four deals with the financing options available for the
construction and operation of the hydroelectric dam. This chapter
looks at the privatization issue and how other financial options could
be exploited with it. Lessons of foreign experience as well as a few
alternatives for privatizing electricity in Mexico are explored.
Chapter five is an analysis of the actual financial and legal
schemes used for the development of the project. The financial
scheme includes investments by the Agriculture Ministry through the
National Water Commission (CNA), investments by the contractor for
the project, a debt issue for 200 million dollars (US) and a credit for
the value of the electromechanical equipment necessary for the power
station.
The legal scheme reflects the way in which the
government manages public-private partnerships and it revolves
around a fiduciary trust. Linked to this trust are six contracts that
govern everything from equipment suppliers to financial advisors
fees. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the various risks
involved.
Chapter six is the conclusion of the thesis and it deals with the
lessons learned from this type of project for future development of
infrastructure works in Mexico.
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2. Background
2.1 Economic Developments in the 1980's
During the 1970's, the Mexican government borrowed
heavily in the international financial markets. During the same
period, the Mexican economy became increasingly dependent on oil
revenues. In 1982, Mexico had the second largest foreign debt in
Latin America amounting to 80.1 billion US dollars, surpassed only
by Brazil. In 1982, a collapse in international oil prices dealt a
major blow to the Mexican economy. Declining government revenues
caused the peso to devaluate and deprived Mexico of the foreign
exchange needed to service its external debt. At the time, then
president Jose Lopez Portillo responded to the crisis by nationalizing
the financial sector of the economy and by declaring a moratorium on
interest payments for foreign debt. Such response prompted other
governments in similar positions to stop servicing their foreign debts
and ultimately the availability of financial capital to the region
became extinct.
During the tenure of Mexico's next president, Miguel de
la Madrid Hurtado (1982-88), public and private investment in the
country dropped and many construction projects were either canceled
or stopped. President de la Madrid introduced an economic
stabilization program which, by the end of his administration, started
to show positive results. Economic recovery became a possibility
with inflation, interest rates and the government budget deficit
decreasing and positive growth in both investment and GNP.
In 1988, de la Madrid's successor took office and by
1989, president Carlos Salinas de Gortari introduced the "Plan
10
Nacional de Desarrollo" a five year development plan intended to
take the policies of the previous president a step further by opening
Mexico's economy, stabilizing inflation, improving efficiency and
productivity, restructuring Mexico's foreign debt and by continuing
to privatize state enterprises which by that time had decreased from
1,171 in 1982 to 414 in 1988. Before such plan, government entities
accounted for over 70 % of aggregate construction spending and the
pattern of such spending was loosely correlated with the timing of
Mexico's presidential election (Fig. 2.1).
11
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The plan included an expanded role for the private sector
in the development of the country's highway system which was in
poor condition and posed a threat to the continued overall economic
growth. A concession program that enabled private construction
firms to invest in new toll roads throughout the country was selected.
After returning the banking industry to the private sector
and enjoying positive results from the effort to modernize the
economy, Mexico's capital markets showed increasing growth and
sophistication. Road concessions were being financed by medium and
long term bond issues rather than simple bank loans and by 1992 the
government was actively seeking the participation of foreign capital
to supplement Mexico's limited internal resources. Figure 2.2
summarizes Mexico's macroeconomic performance from 1979 to 1991.
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2.2 The Highway Program and BOT System
By the time president Salinas took office Mexico's
highway infrastructure was deficient in both magnitude and condition.
Shortly after assuming office, the president introduced the road
concession program. The Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) system
consisted of the government awarding concessions to private
companies for the funding, construction, operation and maintenance
of modern toll roads between key cities creating economic corridors.
The program also included several international bridges.
The basic concept of the program was developed during
the de la Madrid administration when, in 1987, the concessions to
two routes totaling 215 kilometers were awarded. Although the
experimental concessions were financed almost entirely by the state,
the construction firms provided "sweat equity" and gained valuable
experience for the future. The program was left for Salinas to
execute on a large scale.
The highway development program anticipated the
development of 4,000 kilometers of new highways to be built over a
period of five years at a cost of 5 billion dollars. It was to be
extended to a total of 12,000 kilometers in following years. The
rationale for approaching the private sector for the provision of
government services is clearly captured in the "Plan Nacional de
Desarrollo: 1989-1994" which states that "private participation in
this area will contribute to rapid development of infrastructure so
necessary for the country and will ensure that funds are made
available to take care of other priority programs, which are strictly
16
the responsibility of the public sector." It is important to state,
however, that the users of the new highways would bear the burden
through higher tolls. Nevertheless, Mexican law stated that a free
alternate route be available in every case. In most cases the free
alternate routes were in inferior conditions.
The concession process was very different from the
traditional approach in which private companies were involved
exclusively with the construction of the roads. Although similar
concession programs had been carried out in other countries such as
France and Spain, none had the same characteristics as the Mexican
program. Under Mexico's traditional approach, the government
financed, operated and maintained the roads while private sector
firms carried out the construction. Contracts were awarded through
a competitive bid process to the lowest unit cost bidder. The
government would then reimburse the winner on the basis of progress
made. Contracts included escalation clauses that would compensate
the firm for inflation. The shortfalls of this approach that the
construction firms have to contend with are that the government
budget does not coincide with the progress of the project.
Therefore, in many cases, construction firms are paid very late for
work completed and many times are left exposed when a shortfall of
resources occurs in the sponsoring governmental agency.
The concept behind the BOT concession system is that
construction firms bid for the right to collect toll revenues on a
specific route after financing the construction and building the road.
During the concession period (length of concession), the winning firm
has to provide the operation and maintenance of the road and when
17
the concession period is over, the road as well as the tolls return to
government ownership.
What distinguishes the Mexican model from other
concession programs is that the winning bid is selected by the
shortest concession period rather than levels of equity invested,
government subsidies requested and toll rates proposed as is the case
for France and Spain.
By the end of 1991, investment in BOT concessions
totaled 4.6 billion dollars, 700 kilometers were operational and
concessions for 2,600 kilometers had been awarded. The government
expects that by the end of president Salinas' term (1994) 5,760
kilometers of BOT concessions will be in operation.
2.3 BOT Concession Framework
In the case of the highway development program, the
Transportation Ministry "Secretaria de Comunicaciones y
Transportes" (SCT) prepared detailed technical specifications for
each highway and was responsible for securing the right of way along
each route. Such ministry also prepared traffic estimates, specified
the maximum allowable toll and placed, along with the Ministry of
Finance "Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico" (SHCP),
conditions on the financial structure of the concession.
The technical specifications that the SCT prepared
included the highway path, locations and specifications of
interchanges, toll booths and bridges, number of lanes and minimum
standards for construction materials among others. Bidding firms had
to rely on the information provided by the SCT to formulate their
bids.
18
The government guaranteed a minimum level of revenues
to the concessionaire based on traffic forecasts and maximum tolls.
If the projections proved to be conservative, the concession period
could be shortened, the opposite was possible if the volume of usage
was below the projections. The maximum tolls were set so that a
high level of revenues could be obtained. However, the toll could
not be too expensive so that users would choose to pay the toll and
drive through a safer and faster road rather than use the more
dangerous but free and always available alternate roads. The traffic
projections, although later proven to be inaccurate, were made by
looking at the actual traffic in the area with an increase that
accounted for the demand that would be generated when the
completed highway system became operational.
The capital structure of each concession was determined
on a case by case basis by the SCT, SHCP, the winning firm, the
participating financial institution(s) and any other public sector
equity contributor such as CAPUFE (the entity that operates and
maintains public roads). Usually, the winner of the concession had to
provide around 25 % of the total capital requirements from its own
resources. This created an incentive for the winner to minimize
construction costs and increase operating efficiency. Also,
construction firms expanded their role to become developers and
finance firms as well. In some cases, other government entities were
allowed to provide equity capital when the required investment was
too large for a single entity to provide. In theory, concessionaires
did not have to be construction firms. Any public or private entity
19
could act as concessionaire. However, in every case, a construction
firm was involved either individually or as part of a joint venture.
In order to submit a bid, firms had to secure a
commitment from a financial institution that would provide debt
capital for the project. By the beginning of 1992, commercial banks
were the only ones that had provided debt capital to highway
concessions. Such capital was offered at floating interest rates in the
form of short to medium term loans that could be renewed over the
course of the concession. In many cases, one financial institution
would make a commitment with more than one bidder for a particular
concession although not under the same terms (Fig. 2.3).
20
Figure 2.3 Credit Received by the Construction Industry Through
Development and Commercial Banks.
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In order to select the winning bid, the SCT and SHCP
required the bidders to submit extensive documentation that proved
the technical and financial feasibility of the proposal. Winners were
chosen on the basis of the shortest concession period including the
time for construction. When more than one bid had the same
concession time, the government looked at, in order of priority,
shortest construction period, total cost, soundness of financial
proposal, and technical qualifications of the bidder. Once the winner
was selected, a concession title was signed by the SCT, concession
winner and SHCP. Such title defined the length of the concession,
the authorized toll levels, the capital structure of the project and the
responsibilities of each party during the different phases of the
project.
The construction firms that participated in the concession
scheme undertook, in many cases, risks that were not proportional to
their participation. For instance, some times the financial institution
that provided debt capital to a project required collateral consisting
of the construction firm's assets for the total value of the loan. Also,
certain project risks such as changes in specifications during the
construction phase and other government induced delays were
guaranteed by the SCT through concession period extensions which
only increased the uncertainty for both equity and debt holders. Even
though the concession system was very risky for the construction
firms, participation in the highway program was enthusiastic because
firms sensed that such program was only the beginning of the
government's effort to tap the private sector for the development of
22
the country's infrastructure (Fig. 2.4).
23
Figure 2.4 Gross Fixed Private Capital Formation in Construction
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Before construction began, a trust was established to
manage the cash flows related to the project. All parties involved in
the project, including the government agencies that provided equity,
deposited the capital in the trust. As expenses were incurred during
the construction phase, the concessionaire submitted invoices for
reimbursement from the capital held in the trust. Such
reimbursements were discounted by a percentage equal to its equity
stake in the project and therefore, the share of equity of the
concessionaire accumulated over the period of construction in the
form of sweat equity. Interest incurred on the debt was capitalized
during construction so the outstanding amount increased. The
construction firms had a strong incentive to build the road in the
shortest possible time to avoid additional interest costs and to start
generating toll revenues as soon as possible.
If all the available capital was used before the end of the
construction, the participating bank(s), government agencies and/or
private firm would have to increase their capital contribution to the
project. The SCT would increase the length of concession period
only if the cost increases could be proven to be due to factors
outside the concessionaire's control. Also, the SCT could invite
other public sector entity to provide an equity contribution.
Once construction was completed and the road began
operating, the toll revenues flowed through the trust and the income
was used to pay the outstanding debt. Residual revenues were paid
to the concessionaire in the form of dividends. In some cases, the
concessionaire would receive dividends during the entire operating
25
period and in others, it would have to wait until the debt was paid off
before it could receive dividends. The road concession program did
not allow public sector equity holders to receive dividends of any
kind.
When the concession period expired, ownership of the toll
revenues reverted back to the government. The maintenance and
operation of the road became the government's responsibility and the
trust was dissolved.
,Although the highway development program of president
Salinas and the BOT system had some difficulties (mainly because of
inaccurate traffic flow projections) it became clear that the
experience gained in such program could be used in other types of
infrastructure projects. The challenge for the construction industry
was to change from the traditional contractor role to become
developers and providers of capital. This challenge became even
more important because the economic policies of the Salinas'
administration were clearly geared towards a more open economy
where international competition was inevitable. From the
government's point of view, the framework had to be adjusted to
accommodate other types of projects besides highways. Many public
works laws that are outdated have yet to be modernized in order to
make the BOT concession system more efficient, less bureaucratic
and more equitable for all the parties involved.
26
3. THE PROJECT
3.1 Background
The agricultural infrastructure built in northwestern
Mexico has been, undoubtedly, a key aspect supporting the
development of the region as well as an instrument oriented towards
guaranteeing the production of food and other agricultural products
demanded by the country.
Since the past decade, the irrigateable area in
northwestern Mexico has been 1.5 million hectares (3.7 million acres)
which accounts for approximately one fourth of the area under
irrigation in all the country. The high yields that this region has
accomplished have represented 88% of the national production of soy
beans, 40% of the cotton produced and 51% of the rice production.
In general, the agriculture with irrigation of the northwest represents
nearly 30% of the total agricultural production.
The. northwest still offers great opportunities for
increasing its production. On one hand, it is possible to increase the
intensity in the use of the soil in the regions that are currently
irrigated, while on the other, there exist vast regions of land that can
be incorporated to the irrigated agriculture.
The Agriculture ministry (Secretaria de Agricultura y
Recursos Hidraulicos) has defined the Hydraulic Interconnected
System of the Northwest in order to make better use of the water and
soil resources of the region. Their long term plans include the
modernization of the existing irrigated districts as well as the
irrigation of 520,000 hectares (1.28 million acres) which represent
27
65% of the estimated potential area to be irrigated in the region
(Figure 3.1).
Included under this general framework is the Sinaloa -
Fuerte - Mayo subsystem, in the north of the state of Sinaloa and
south of the state of Sonora. Contained in such subsystem is the
development of Huites project which includes the construction of a
dam with a storage capacity of 4.568 billion cubic meters, the
construction of a hydroelectric plant with a capacity of 400
Megawatts and the construction of the infrastructure to irrigate
70,000 hectares (173,000 acres) in the states of Sonora and Sinaloa.
3.1.1 Exploitation of the Fuerte River
Located on the Fuerte River in the northern part of
the state of Sinaloa and near the border between the states of
Chihuahua and Sonora, Huites dam will enable the complete
exploitation of this important stream.
28
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The median annual flow of the Fuerte river
downstream from where it meets the Alamo brook surpasses 4.812
billion cubic meters. 80% of this flow has been exploited since two
decades ago for the irrigation of 271,000 hectares (670,000 acres).
Such exploitation for agricultural purposes has been accomplished
with the Miguel Hidalgo dam and the Josefa Ortiz de Dominguez dam.
The first is located downstream from Huites' site and the second on
the Alamo brook, inflowing the Fuerte river, downstream from the
Miguel Hidalgo dam. The storage capacity of the two existing dams
is 3.4 billion cubic meters and the Miguel Hidalgo dam has a
hydroelectric generating unit with capacity of 60 Megawatts that
allows an annual median generating output of 290 Gigawatts hours.
The Fuerte river presents periodic discharges
caused by the melting of ice during spring and by tropical storms and
cyclones during summer. The record maximum flow registered was
15,000 cubic meters per second and occurred in January of 1960.
The most recent flow was of 13,000 cubic meters per second and
occurred in December of 1990. Such discharges have caused serious
flooding and damage in the region because the installed capacity is
not sufficient to manage the maximum flows.
3.2 Project Development
The site known as "Boquilla de Huites" (Huites nozzle)
has been explored and studied for five decades by the Agriculture
Ministry (Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos, SARH).
In 1974 and 1977 such ministry conducted' detailed surveys of the
terrain in order to develop several feasible designs for the dam.
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In 1941, a weather station was installed at "Boquilla de
Huites" in order to gather information about the flow of the Fuerte
river in this particular site. The following information summarizes
the relevant findings for the design of the dam:
The volume of the median annual flow of the Fuerte River at
Hiutes is 3.771 billion cubic meters.
During the summer between the end of June and middle of
October a flood period occurs with maximum registered flows of
7,000 cubic meters per second. Such flows generally occur at the
end of the period.
During the winter between the middle of December and the
beginning of March, a second flood period occurs registering the
maximum instantaneous flows; the historic maximum was
registered in March 1980 with 14,500 cubic meters per second.
The low water period occurs between March and June. The
lowest flows occur in May and have registered as little as 20 cubic
meters per second.
The governmental agency in charge of electricity
generation Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE) and the water
resource management agency Comision Nacional del Agua (CNA) (a
decentralized entity of the SARH) analyzed the above data in order to
define the design parameters for Huites dam including the type of
spillway structure, the dimensions and characteristics of the
embankment and the maximum probable flow at the site of the dam.
From the analysis, the structure of the dam was defined (described
later) in order to accommodate ordinary flows of 15,000 cubic meters
per second which are regulated at 7,000 cubic meters per second.
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With the defined structure, the maximum probable flow with peaks of
30,000 cubic meters per second is regulated at 22,445 cubic meters
per second. From such analysis, the maximum extraordinary water
level and the capacity for flow control of Huites dam was determined
(Figure 3.2).
Miguel Hidalgo dam regulates the flows that leave Huites
dam. The 7.,000 cubic meters per second flow is regulated to 3,000
cubic meters per second and the 22,445 cubic meters per second flow
is regulated to 18,500 cubic meters per second. Consequently, the
flows that have occurred since 1942 can be regulated up to 80% so
that the discharge from Miguel Hidalgo dam results within the
capacity of the riverbed down to the mouth of the Fuerte river.
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Figure 3.2 Control of the Maximum Probable Flow Into Huites Dam
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3.3 Project Description
The site of Huites dam is located in the municipality of
Choix in the state of Sinaloa. Its geographic coordinates are 26° 50'
32" latitude north and 108 ° 22' 12" longitude west.
The exploitation of the Fuerte river at the "Boquilla de
Huites" site requires a dam with uncommon characteristics. Its
height as well as the design parameters of the spillway will make it
one of the most important dams in Mexico. Also impressive are the
volumes of materials and excavation required.
3.3.1 The Dam
The embankment of the project is a conventional
concrete type in gravity section. It has a maximum height of 166
meters closing in the right bank of the river with an arch type
embankment.
The riverbed at the nozzle has a height of 150
meters above sea level and it is filled with alluvium with a maximum
depth of 20 meters. Under the alluvium there is granite rock with an
approximate depth of 5 meters, this rock is exposed to the elements.
Intact granite is located at a height of 125 meters above sea level.
The design of the dam calls for the foundation of
the embankment to consist of a consolidation carpet with 15 meters
of-depth and a waterproof screen with 50 meters of depth. This
requires drilling 14,000 meters for the injection in the area of the
carpet and an additional 12,000 meters for the waterproof screen.
The cross section of the embankment is 8 meters
wide at the crown with an elevation of 290.75 meters above sea level
with a blind parapet facing upriver measuring 1.25 meters and
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reaching 292 meters above sea level. The upriver face of the wall is
vertical in the upper section and has an inclination of 0. 1:1 in the
lower section. The down river face the wall has an inclination of
0.75:1.
The embankment is 426 meters in length at the
crown. For its construction, 2,360,000 cubic meters of concrete will
be used and 485,000 cubic meters of excavation are needed. (Fig.
3.3)
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:3.3.2 Diversion Channel
In order to build the different components of the
dam, the Fuerte river must first be diverted from its original course
so that the water from the river does not interfere with the
construction activities. The diversion channel is located at the right
bank of the nozzle. It has no slope and it's altitude is 150 meters
above sea level. Such channel was designed to contain a flow of
8,500 cubic meters per second. The design of the channel consists of
a 28 meters wide footprint with a trapeze like cross section that has
inclined walls at 0.25:1 and a height of 33 meters. When the
maximum flow occurs, the water will reach a height, relative to the
bottom of the channel, of 32 meters at the entrance and 20 meters at
the exit point.
The cofferdams that will close the riverbed to divert
the water flow to the diversion channel will be positioned over the
riverbed at an altitude of 150 meters above sea level. A waterproof
flexible screen that encompasses the whole area where alluvium
material exists will be tied to the waterproof nucleus of each
cofferdam. The upriver cofferdam has a height of 33.7 meters while
the one down river has a height of 21.5 meters.
The construction of the diversion channel requires
970,000 cubic meters of excavation and 69,000 cubic meters of
concrete. The cofferdams require 718,000 cubic meters of material.
3.3.3 Control Structure and Spillway
The control structure and spillway are located on
the left bank of the river and consist of a structure that houses four
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radial gates over a peak that is tied to a discharge channel. The
discharge channel is divided in the middle by a wall. Such wall
defines, on the left bank, a service canal that handles ordinary flows
and, on the right bank, a canal that handles major flows. The
capacity of the structure is 22,445 cubic meters per second.
The control structure is made up of four sections of
spillway. Each section is controlled with one radial gate that
measures 15.5 meters wide and 21 meters high.
The discharge of the radial gates starts at the
summit towards a channel with a rectangular cross section. Such
channel has a slope of 1.25:1 and is connected to a cylindrical
surface with 176.11 meters of radius. The cylindrical surface
deposits the flow approximately 120 meters from the gates. The
spillway structure can be directly accessed from the crown of the
embankment. (Fig. 3.4)
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3.3.4 Hydroelectric Plant
The inlet for electricity generation is located on the
right bank in the body of the dam and the hydroelectric plant is at the
foot of the dam. The plant is equipped with two Francis turbines of
200 MW of generating capacity each for a total of 400 MW. The
Francis turbines are designed for a rate of flow of 235 cubic meters
per second operating with a plant factor of 0.25. For the discharge,
a vent gate is used in each exit pipe.
The water inlet consists of two steel pipes 7.8
meters in diameter located in the embankment. Such pipes feed the
generating units from their down river end. From a vertical point of
view, the two pipes have a slope of 0.75:1 in their initial section and
then, through an elbow, become horizontal with their axis at 147
meters above sea level. The design includes gates for emergency
closure that operate mechanically with two servo motors mounted at
the same level as the crown of the embankment.
The transformers are located in a patio on the right
bank of the river while the substation is located on the roof of the
equipment room. The plant will be connected to the northwestern
sector of the national electricity grid. (Fig. 3.5)
Table 3.1 summarizes the features of the project and figure 3.6
shows the general layout.
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Table 3.1
Main Characteristics of the Project
DESCRIPTION VOLUMES
( millions of cubic meters)
Maximum Capacity of the Reservoir During Extraordinary 4,568
Flows
Capacity of the Reservoir During Ordinary Flows 2,908
Capacity for Sediments 500
Useful Capacity for Irrigation and Electricity Generation 2,408
Capacity for Flow Control 1,102
Superstorage 558
ALTITUDES
DESCRIPTION (meters above sea level)
Upriver Blind Parapet of the Dam 292.00
Crown of the Dam 290.75
Upper Control Water Level 290.00
Ordinary Control Water Level 270.00
Minimum Operational Water Level 215.00
Spillway Crest 258.00
Water Inlet Threshold 190.00
RATES OF FLOW
DESCRIPTION (cubic meters per second)
Maximum Inflow to the Reservoir 30,000
Maximum Outflow from the Spillway 22,445
Maximum Flow Through the Diversion Channel 8,500
DESCRIPTION
Excavation for the Diversion Channel
Excavation for the Equipment Room
Excavation for the Spillway
Excavation for the Dam
TOTAL EXCAVATION
CONSTRUCTION
VOLUMES (cubic meters)
970,000
956,000
861,000
485,000
3,272,000
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Table 3.1 Continued
Main Characteristics of the Project
DESCRIPTION CONSTRUCTION
VOLUMES (cubic meters)
Concrete for the Diversion Channel 69,000
Concrete for the Equipment Room 87,000
Concrete for the Spillway 464,000
Concrete for the Dam 2,360,000
TOTAL CONCRETE 2,980,000
Earth moving for the Cofferdams 718,000
Source: Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos, Comision
Nacional del Agua.
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3.4 Project Execution
:3.4.1 Public Bid
The Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources Ministry
(SARH) via the National Commission for Water (CNA) invited
several construction companies from Mexico to bid for the
construction of Huites dam. The project was a BOT arrangement
that included the construction of the dam along with any
infrastructure necessary such as roads, camps, etc; the construction
of a hydroelectric plant along with the supply of all the necessary
equipment such as generators, turbines, etc; and finally, an
investment scheme to provide the financial resources necessary to
complete the project.
After setting the minimum requirements that the
competing firms had to cover, only two groups of bidders were left.
On one side was a joint venture comprised of Grupo Mexicano de
Desarrollo with the Brazilian firm Companhia Brasileira de Projectos
e Obras (GMD-CBPO) and on the other was La Nacional Compafiia
Constructora jointly with Ingenieros Civiles Asociados (ICA) through
a newly formed company by the name of Desarrolladora Mexicana de
Huites (ICA...La Nacional).
The bid had to include the following information:
1. Total amount of the investment.
2. Cost of the project based on unit prices.
3. Financial scheme including the amounts of
internal resources, long term and medium term
credits and contribution of the federal
government.
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4. Percentage of Mexican resources and equipment
used.
5. Construction schedule.
6. Letters of commitment form the sources of
financing.
7. Other legal documents noting that the firm is
properly registered and licensed.
The bids had to be presented at 6:00 PM on May 13,
1992. CNA would then take some time to evaluate the two bids and
decide on a winner.
After careful evaluation of the bids by several
government agencies, it was decided that the two groups, GMD-
CBPO and ICA-La Nacional should jointly build the project. For
such purposes, the four companies formed a consortium and named it
"Consorcio Mexicano Constructor de Huites S.A de C.V." (CMCH).
3.4.2 Organizational Structure
In order to function effectively as a team rather
than four individual companies, the participants decided on an
organizational scheme that would have its own identity, would
function independently from the four participants and one in which all
four companies would be represented. Also, it became a goal of the
participants to exploit the areas of knowledge and experience of each
company in order to create an organization that was more than the
sum of its parts. The organization begins with the stockholders of
CMCH of which GMD-CBPO have 50% ownership and ICA-La
Nacional the other 50%. An "Administration Board" was formed and
is made up of two officers each from GMD, La Nacional and ICA
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along with one officer of CBPO. Below the board, an executive
committee was formed with one officer from each company. Below
the executive committee comes the operational organization. Table
3.2 describes the decisions each major component is empowered to
take and figures 3.7 and 3.8 show a graphical representation of the
complete scheme.
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Table 3.2 Decisional Structure
48
Description Responsible Entity
Changes in Organization Administration Board
Appointment of top officers Administration Board
Salary policies Administration Board
Equipment procurement policy Administration Board
Cement procurement policy Administration Board
Aproval of appointed officers Executive Committee
Contracting permanent consultants Executive Committee
Approval of equipment purchases Executive Committee
Procurement procedures Executive Committee
Approval of construction schedule Executive Committee
Approval of subcontracts Executive Committee
Appointment of area managers Project Director
Auxiliary service contracting Project Director
u
u
I.-
-
o)
c-
vwl
.c-
to 
C I
0co
r-
C
0
.-
'e
C.)
._
O
W)
13.4.3 Construction Schedule and Progress
The schedule for the construction of Huites calls
for the termination of the work in 30 months. Construction began in
July 1992, all construction work will be finished in December 1994
and the hydroelectric plant is to begin operating in July 1995. The
following table shows the work that was planned for and the progress
achieved at the time this work was written.
Desc ription
Concrete in diversion
channel
Excavation for equipment
room
3Boreholes for precut of
equipment room
Borehole for cut of
equipment room
Excavation of spillway
Boreholes for precut of
spillway
Boreholes for spillway cut
Concrete for spillway
Excavation in dike
Concrete in dike
Extraction of alluvium
Units
m 3
Planned
103,000
650,000
m
m
m3
m
m
m3
m 3
m3
m3
7,200
14,913
881,000
4,900
6,488
0
75,000
25,000
1,737,500
Completed
38,313
515,839
8,219
17,018
828,925
12,159
10,056
982
39,532
1,083
1,401,953
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C/P %
37 %
79 %
114 %
114 %
94 %
248 %
155 %
53 %
4%
81 %
3.4.4 Miscellaneous Facts
During May 1993, a 45 kilometer electrical line was
installed from the nearest town (Choix) to the site, the license for the
operation of a railroad spur was approved, the pavement of the road
between Choix and Huites was completed and the waterproof screens
of the cofferdams were completed. In the same month, 58 units of
heavy machinery and a total of 2,671 people including subcontractors
were working at the site. 69 subcontracts had been awarded totaling
66.8 million dollars and the value of the remaining work was 213
million dollars.
3.5 Benefits of the Project
3.5.1 Agricultural Benefits
The joint operation of the Miguel Hidalgo dam, the
Josefa Ortiz de Dominguez dam and Huites dam along the Fuerte
river and the Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (Bacurato) dam on the Sinaloa
river as well as the aquifers located in the valleys of the rivers will
generate an increase in the productivity of the irrigated areas that
form part of the Sinaloa-Fuerte-Mayo subsystem. The irrigated area
will increase by 70,000 hectares and from this, the following benefits
will be obtained:
The use of 3.231 billion cubic meters to irrigate 229,000
hectares in the "Distrito de Riego del Valle del Fuerte" (Fuerte
Valley Irrigation District) with an irrigation sheet of 1.54 meters.
The use of 525 million cubic meters to irrigate 42,000
hectares in the "Distrito de Riego del Valle del Carrizo" (Carrizo
Valley Irrigation District) with an irrigation sheet of 1.35 meters.
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The use of 402.5 million cubic meters to open 35,000
hectares in the state of Sinaloa with an irrigation sheet of 1.15
meters.
The use of 1.2403 billion cubic meters to irrigate 105,000
hectares in the "Distrito de Riego del Valle del Guasave" (Guasave
Valley Irrigation District) with an irrigation sheet of 1.25 meters.
A total of 6.057 billion cubic meters of water will
be used to irrigate a total of 446,000 hectares. During average
conditions, 4.448 billion cubic meters will be obtained from the
Fuerte river; 1.14 billion cubic meters from the Sinaloa river; 250
million cubic meters from the Guasave aquifer and 151 million cubic
meters from the Fuerte aquifer.
The agricultural production from the area that will
be irrigated once Huites dam is in operation will include wheat, corn,
bean, chickpea, soy bean, sorghum, sesame, potatoes and other
vegetables (Table 3.3). The total agricultural production is expected
at 480,000 tons with a value of 347 million new pesos (1 US dollar =
3.11 new pesos) per year.
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Table 3.3
Agricultural Production in the New Irrigation Areas
Source: Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos
Nacional del Agua.
Hidraulicos, Comision
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CROP SURFACE PRODUCTION VALUE
(hectares) (tons) (millions new pesos)
Wheat 21,700 97,650 48,434
Corn 16,050 60,575 35,134
Beans 5,150 7,725 15,450
Canola 4,650 8,370 7,473
Soya Beans 3,650 6,935 6,588
Sorghum 3,100 15,500 5,580
Chickpeas 2,450 4,165 4,040
Potatoes 2,000 50,000 75,000
Sesame 1,800 2,700 4,050
Produce 16,450 232,250 145,875
TOTAL 77,000 485,870 347,624
3.5.2 Benefits from the Hydroelectric Project
The Huites hydroelectric plant has an installed
capacity of 400 MW that will be an important supply of energy during
peak hours. With a plant factor of 0.25, an estimated median annual
generation of 875 GWhr is expected. If the price of one KWhr is 7
US cents, the value of the energy generated by Huites is 157.5
million new pesos annually.
3.5.3 Flood Control
With Huites dam in operation, the flood control
capabilities in northwestern Mexico will be doubled. It will be
possible to contain flows such as the ones that have been registered
from the Fuerte river since 1942, reducing the damages to a
minimum. The capacity to regulate the flows diminishes the risk of
floods in a region of 50,000 hectares.
In 1990, there was a flow in the Fuerte river that
caused damage to 40,000 residents resulting in losses of more than
150 million new pesos in lost crops. Huites dam will prevent this
sort of disasters.
3.5.4 Other Benefits
Other benefits that are attributable to the project
include the generation of jobs during the construction period. An
estimated 10 million manpower days will be generated in the region.
Also, fishing and other water related activities will be developed as
has been the case in other nearby reservoirs.
3.6 Land Ownership and Environmental Concerns
Once the dam is completed, an estimated 9,457 hectares
will be flooded by the reservoir. The flooded area includes 323
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houses, 8 schools, crops, one church, several roads and other
buildings. The federal government is responsible for compensating
the local residents as well as relocating them to a new site. So far,
the government has begun the process of valuing the properties which
includes taking a new census of the region and defining the legal
ownership as well as the boundaries of the properties and their
contents. The federal government has held over 150 meetings with
resident of the area to analyze each case individually.
The basic goals of the relocation program are to
guarantee the residents equal or better living conditions, services and
communications and to finish the process in a timely manner so that
it does not interfere with the construction of the project.
In the environmental aspect, studies have been made
with a ten year horizon in mind. It is assumed that in ten years, all
the environmental alterations will have happened. Some of the
probable negative consequences include solid dispersions, organic
pollution and salinization of the soil. Some of the positive
consequences include rain periods, water bodies, underground water
extraction, handy natural resources, recharge of aquifer bodies and a
general increase in the standard of living of the population of the
area.
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4. FINANCIAL ALTERNATIVES AND PRIVATIZATION
In this chapter, the financial alternatives that were available to
the Mexican government, at the time the decision to build Huites was
made, will be explored. Clearly, traditional financing methods and
instruments were accessible to the government. Such methods
include tax financing, debt financing (with the pertinent debt
instruments for energy projects) and some limited forms of
privatization. The first part of the chapter will provide an overview
of the aforementioned traditional alternatives. In the second part of
the chapter, the issue of privatization along with the limited forms
available to the Mexican government will be described. Also, an
explanation of why limits exist on privatization options will ensue.
The final part of the chapter deals with the question of transferring
the state run electricity monopoly in Mexico, Comision Federal de
Electricidad (CFE), to private hands. It is argued, in the final
section, that a wider array of financial options would be available
for the government to build energy projects such as Huites, if it
chose to privatize generation and distribution of electricity. The
advantages and disadvantages of such action will be analyzed as well
as the lessons learned from the experiences of other countries.
4. 1 Traditional Financial Alternatives
The Mexican government has always relied on traditional
financing methods to fund infrastructure projects. The two methods
mentioned are tax finance and debt finance.
Tax finance means that the federal, state and local
governments raise funds through increases in the different types of
taxes (income, property, etc.). Sometimes, special taxes are
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introduced when funds need to be raised for a special project, for
example, the property taxes in a certain area may be increased to
fund a development that is thought to raise the value of such
properties when finished. Tax finance has two very important
disadvantages. First, taxes usually do not keep pace with inflation
and second, taxes are very unpopular.
Capital finance can be achieved in several ways ranging
from straight borrowing from banks and financial institutions to the
issue of debt in national as well as international financial markets.
The principal debt instrument used by the Mexican government is the
CETE. CETES are the equivalent of treasury bonds in the US. At
the time this thesis was written, the interest paid by the benchmark
28 day maturity CETES was 16 percent in nominal terms in Mexican
pesos. Since inflation was at 10%, interest paid on 28 day maturity
CETES was 6% in real terms.
Capital financing has been extensively used by the
government in the past, nevertheless, at the present time, the
Mexican government is extremely skeptical about adding more public
debt after finally gaining control of the economy and the public
sector's finances.
4.2 Privatization
Privatization is the delivery of public sector services, by
the private sector. It involves a transfer of responsibilities, risks and
benefits from the government to private hands. There are several
forms of privatization ranging from total private ownership such as
denationalization, to public private partnerships and limited period
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partnerships such as franchising, contracting through BOT schemes
and concessions.
Not every form of privatization can be applied to a single
instance, but rather each form is beneficial to a specific type of
project or development. For example, it would be very complicated
to privatize a banking system through franchising when the
denationalization alternative clearly provides a better option in terms
of creating an efficient structure for the industry.
Privatization advocates argue that the private sector can
produce and deliver a service in a more efficient way because of
competition. Since private firms are profit oriented, it is argued that
they have an incentive to provide a better service at a lower cost.
Private firms also tend to be more flexible and have a faster response
times than government entities that have to deal with procedural and
bureaucratic delays. Another important consideration is the
selectiveness of the private and public sectors. The private sector
will only make capital investments when a profit opportunity is
present and when confronted with two or more of such opportunities,
it will choose the one that maximizes the potential profit. On the
other hand, the public sector has other considerations besides profit
when choosing between alternative projects. For example, social
welfare, need, and political feasibility. Therefore, private sector
projects are more efficient and are operated with less waste.
Privatization opponents argue that in many cases, when
the market fails (not enough competition exists) private firms will
lack the key incentive of providing high quality low cost services and
are more likely to take advantage of the consumers than the
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government. There also exists a risk of service interruption or
termination if a firm finds itself in financial distress. This risk is
almost non existent in the public sector.
Regarding the issue of financing public works,
privatization provides several options for governments to fund
infrastructure projects like the case in point. The rest of this section
will explore the relevant opportunities available to the Mexican
government at the time Huites was born.
4.2.1 Privatization Options to Fund Huites
In order to mention the relevant privatization
options that can be used to fund a project of the nature of Huites, it
is necessary to define what types of goods can be privatized and then
which privatization alternatives work best with each type of product
or service.
"Goods are classified into four categories: private
goods, toll goods, common-pool goods, and collective or public
goods. Private goods are individually consumed, and exclusion is
possible; toll goods are jointly consumed, and exclusion is possible;
common pool goods are individually consumed and exclusion is not
possible; and collective goods are jointly consumed and exclusion is
not possible.." (Liddle 1993). From this classification we gather that
electricity is a toll good (in Mexico, unlike water supply, electricity
can be shut off if the user fails to pay for it) and exclusion is
possible. "Toll goods can be both privately provided and supplied..."
(Liddle 1993). Therefore, like the toll road privatization program, in
theory, increases in the electricity generating capacity of the country
could be financed with some form private sector participation.
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The privatization options that can work with toll
goods are contracting, concessions, grants, leases (and sale and
leaseback), BOT schemes, user fees and public-private partnerships.
However, at the time this thesis was written, there
were two laws in Mexico that greatly reduced the government's
financial options through privatization. The first one grants the CNA
the exclusive right to operate dams in Mexico. The second one
grants the CFE the exclusive right to generate and distribute
electricity in Mexico.
Since the private sector cannot provide electricity,
it can only be involved in the construction of electricity generating
projects. Therefore, only a couple of the privatization forms
mentioned above were available to the Mexican government to
finance Huites: Public-private partnerships and user fees.
"In a public-private partnership the public and
private sectors share the risks and responsibilities of a project."
(Liddle 1993). There are many ways in which a partnership of this
nature can be structured and each party involved can share the risks
of a project in varying degrees. In the case of Huites, a partnership
would have to be structured so that most of the risk falls on the
government and only the risks involved with the construction fall on
the private firms. The government can transfer the construction risks
to the private sector through a turnkey approach. This approach
requires the private firm to put up a sum of money to fully or
partially fund the construction of a project. Once it is finished, the
private firms delivers the project in perfect working condition to the
government. Once the transfer is complete, a period elapses (to
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make sure the project works consistently) and the firm receives the
original investment plus a return. In other words, the private firm is
required to put a sum of money as a guarantee during the
construction phase.
User fees are understood to be "... any fee, charge
or dedicated tax that is paid by those benefiting from a facility or the
services it provides. For example, user fees would include a gasoline
tax where the revenues are dedicated to highway construction and
maintenance, tuition charges at state universities or admission fees to
state parks." (Vaughan 1983)
In this case, CFE would charge the users of the
electricity provided by Huites an extra fee to cover the expenses
incurred in its construction. Since Huites will also provide irrigation
benefits, the users of the water would also be charged a surplus fee
to recover the costs. This form of privatization has several inherent
flaws because the fees charged will be used to recover money spent in
the past, therefore, there is no incentive to keep costs down. Also, it
is unclear if CFE can distinguish the users of electricity from a single
facility. Since it controls a monopoly, it may simply transfer
electricity generated in one region to another and therefore, all the
clients of CFE would have to be charged for capacity increases.
Making, in effect, user fees become tax increases.
The last form of privatization available to the
government is of course, denationalization of CFE. The rest of the
chapter will deal with this subject and with the other forms of
financing that can be used if electricity could be generated and
delivered by the private sector.
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4.3 Denationalization of CFE
"Denationalization or divestiture involves the sale of
government assets to the private sector. There are a number of ways
the transfer of ownership can be achieved." (Liddle 1993). The rest
of this section will explore the options of privatizing CFE as a
monopoly, as a competitive privatization, the advantages and
disadvantages of each, the financial options each could provide, the
criteria that should be used in the decision and the lessons of foreign
experience.
4.3.1 Denationalization of CFE as a Monopoly
There are several ways in which CFE could be
privatized as a monopoly, namely: i) Privatization as a monolith. ii)
Initial privatization as a monolith with new power stations open to
private ownership. iii) Establishment of integrated regional utilities.
In the following paragraphs, each of this options will be analyzed
further.
Privatizing CFE as a single unit would require a
government entity to control the price structure charged by the new
company in order to prevent it from abusing monopoly powers. Such
regulation would have to indicate the return the company is entitled
to relative to some asset base that would have to be defined.
This option has some clear advantages, it would be
easy to understand and describe in a prospectus. And judging from
the privatization of other large entities in Mexico (such as Telefonos
de Mexico), relatively easy to finance. Another advantage of this
option is that it could be completed relatively fast and with minimal
opposition since other strategic industries such as
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telecommunications and financial have already been privatized. Also,
the risk of foreign domination can be minimized.
Regarding the financing of capacity increases with
projects such as Huites, the new private company could raise the
necessary funds through equity issues in the stock market and/or debt
issues with electricity receipts as guarantee. In either case, the
Mexican government would achieve the goal of building new projects
without incurring more public debt. A different option would be user
fees. It is fair to say that since a private firm manages more
efficiently and with less waste than a government bureaucracy, the
new private electricity company could better identify the users of it's
product and therefore, take advantage of user fee schemes. This
schemes would have to be approved and regulated by the government
to prevent abuse.
Nevertheless, the disadvantages of monolithic
privatization outweigh the advantages. Maintaining CFE as a
monopoly after the transfer to the private sector would mean that no
competition would be introduced whatsoever and therefore, the
possible economic benefits of such competition would be forfeited.
Also, the regulation by the government would not be effective.
Essentially, this option would try to achieve through limited
regulation, what the virtually unlimited powers of direct public
ownership have failed to achieve, namely to establish competitive
standards of cost effectiveness.
If CFE maintains its monopoly structure in private
hands, the government basically transfers its power to the
shareholders of the new company. Supposedly, the shareholders
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would pressure management to run and maintain an efficient and
profitable operation. However, in such a large entity, there will
surely be a large number of shareholders both small and large and
none with enough power to influence the company.
Other disadvantages include the great political
leverage that such company would have, the great political will and
determination that the government entity charged with regulating the
industry would need (and would be unlikely to attain) as well as the
uncertainties that will surely stem from the discretionary powers of
such agency. The effects on the privatization of related industries
such as coal and finally, the risk of undervaluing the company at the
time of the sale.
Privatizing CFE as a monolith and allowing for
competitive new generation would permit private companies to
compete to construct and own power stations, and to sell power from
their facilities. Private companies would presumably enjoy easy
access, on fair terms, to the transmission network and would be able
to sell their power to the public. This scheme has many similarities
with the previous one, it shares many of the same advantages and
disadvantages. The question is weather this prospect is realistic and
weather it is significant enough to overcome the unacceptable
drawbacks of monolithic privatization.
In order to fully explore this alternative, it is
assumed that an independent transmission system would exist that
would have to be regulated by the government. If the privatized CFE
is allowed to maintain control of the entire transmission system, then
there can be no effective competition in the electricity industry.
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This privatization option has, like the one before,
has more disadvantages than benefits, it is not realistic and it does
not introduce significant enough competition to make it attractive.
In the first place, to be effective, new entrants must be able to offer
a balanced, flexible supply of power , backed up by reserve capacity.
This means they must come in with a spread of power stations, not on
a single station-by-station basis (Sykes, Robinson 1987). But a
single power station takes years to complete since its conception, so
competition will unlikely occur for a very long time. Moreover, the
incumbent would have overwhelming advantages such as its size,
political leverage and relationships with long time customers and
suppliers. The private CFE could accommodate any pattern of
demand, provide security of supply and require far less stringent
contract terms than its competitors since it would enjoy a greater
diversity of customers. It could also use its existing assets and cross
subsidies to finance capacity increases, further strengthening its
powers.
In conclusion, the competitors that would exist in
such system would be relegated to supply a minimal amount of power
to the private CFE and the monopoly would remain effectively intact.
The third option for privatizing CFE as a monopoly
is the establishment of regional monopolies. In this scheme, regions
would be defined and a monopoly would control each region. Each
monopoly would own the generation and distribution rights in its
region with an independent national grid, regulated by the
government, that would serve to coordinate inter region sales,
oversee fair competition and avoid discrimination.
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The advantages of such system are that it would
decentralize generation, it would be more responsive to consumers, it
can be financed in stages avoiding foreign domination or control and
it would permit the privatization of other related industries such as
coal mining. There are however, several fatal disadvantages to this
system. The most important is the complexity of the privatization.
It would be extremely complicated to divide CFE into regions with
similar assets and growth opportunities. Negotiations could not be
successful without the cooperation of management and the unions
involved, and even then, the privatization would take a very long
time and be very costly. It is probable that a strict regulating system
would have to be created causing regulation delays, costs and
ambiguities.
In conclusion, none of the monopoly options are
very attractive. In the next section, the options of competitive
privatization of CFE will be explored.
4.3.2 Alternatives for Competitive Privatization of CFE
There are several alternatives for competitive
privatization of CFE. The first alternative would be to privatize both
generation and distribution separately, maintaining the national grid
in public hands or if not, closely regulated. By separating
distribution from generation, the generating companies would first,
face direct competition from others like them and second, have
several potential customers, in effect creating a market for electricity
in Mexico. The purpose of keeping the national grid either public or
closely regulated is so that the different generating firms and other
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power sources can be linked, coordinated and have guaranteed access
on fair and equal terms.
There are many advantages to this option, it can be
achieved without risking foreign control or domination, regulation
would not be very complicated and the consumers of electricity
would benefit greatly from competition. Regarding the development
of new projects to increase generating capacity (such as Huites), the
generating companies could sign long term contracts with the
distribution firms and use such contracts to raise debt in order to pay
for the projects. Generating companies could also issue equity to
raise the necessary capital and the government could provide grants
or subsidies to complement the capital raised in the case of larger
projects. Finally, a whole new range of public-private partnerships
could be introduced with risk sharing schemes that do not place the
majority of the burden on the government.
The disadvantages of this type of privatization are
mainly due to the complexity and size of CFE. Devising a generating
system based on five or more independent, viable companies, each
with an efficient mix of generating capacity is a complicated
technical task. Negotiations with the current managers of CFE and
it's unions is also a complicated and time consuming problem.
Contractual relationships would have to be set up between the
generating companies and the distributors of power, but this can only
be done after the generating companies are defined. Finally, two
problems have to be contemplated carefully, one is that the only
entity that has any knowledge and familiarity with the system is CFE
so it has to carry on its own demise. Second, a series of companies
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with no profit record, an untried structure and management and in an
uncertain regulatory climate would have to be sold to potential
private sector buyers.
All the operation would probably take more than six
years to complete. Since the presidential term in Mexico is six years,
a great political will would be necessary to start the process.
Since it would be extremely difficult to sell parts of
CFE directly to the private sector without a transition period, other
alternatives can be contemplated to start the process. Such interim
alternatives can be achieved only if the two exclusion laws regarding
electricity generation and distribution in Mexico are overturned.
The government could use the concession scheme
much like it has done with the new highways. In this system, private
firms would either pay for existing generating units or build new
ones. The government would then grant a concession to the firm that
included distribution. In this way, new generating facilities could be
financed based on future electricity bills from customers or with the
use of funds received through the sale of concessions of existing
facilities.
Another alternative is to expand the "Build Operate
Transfer" (BOT) system to "Build Own Operate Transfer" (BOOT).
With BOOT contracts, the private sector would provide the
government with a service in exchange for a fee. After a specified
period of time, the private sector would transfer the facility to public
ownership through a sale. In this case, the government can increase
electrical capacity without incurring in more debt. Private firms
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could finance such capacity increases based on the fees to be charged
and on a lump sum at the end of the defined period.
Opponents of this method argue that although it is a
good short term alternative, in the long run the public sector is
adversely affected because it has to pay for a facility twice.
Nevertheless, this alternative can be altered to become a straight
forward long term service contract (in other words build, own,
operate) by extending the original specified period and thus, avoiding
the buy-back expense.
A final alternative is the sale and leaseback option.
In this case, the government would sell its existing generating
facilities, receiving large up-front capital that could be use to finance
new facilities. After such sale, the government would have to lease
back the facilities. This option would minimize disruption risks and
the government would lease a facility that has been proved to operate
consistently. For the. private sector, it would mean a capital
investment like any other.
4.3.3 Privatization Criteria
Although there are many opposing views regarding
the different privatization alternatives of a large entity such as CFE,
there are several economic, political, essential and desirable
characteristics such a privatization should meet. The rest of this
section will explore such criteria.
Politically, there are several essential criteria that
have to be met. "No government could contemplate changing the
structure of so basic an industry as electricity if significant
disruption in the supply of power seemed likely to ensue." (Sykes and
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Robinson 1987). It seems unlikely this would happen because
electricity is supplied everyday without serious disruption. This
experience has to be transferred to the private sector.
The government must also minimize the risk of
electoral unpopularity. If the consumers are neglected after the
privatization and they feel that the service was better when in public
hands, the administration that carried out such privatization would
pay the price politically.
Since the privatization of such a large entity will
require huge sums of money, the government must be careful to
include foreign participation without giving up control or domination
of the industry to foreign parties.
In the economic area, the essential criteria are the
introduction of maximum competition and the attractiveness to
individual and corporate investors. Even if CFE is privatized in
several stages or goes through a transition period, the government
must make sure that the resulting industry can provide all the
economic benefits brought by competition. In the long run, if
consumers are not satisfied with the gains from the privatization, the
government would loose credibility and suffer political consequences.
Finally, the privatization must be structured in such
a way that enough individual and corporate investors are attracted to
participate. This can be done with clear regulations and the assured
cooperation of management and unions. Any action having
predictable positive impacts on earnings would enhance the
attractiveness of the industry to potential investors.
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4.3.4 Lessons of Foreign Experience
The electricity supply industry has many different
structures around the world. These range from the monolithic
publicly owned systems through diversified public and privately
owned systems and to the predominantly privately owned. Systems of
electricity prices regulation are also diverse and range from control
by government, through strict, detailed regulation and to informal
methods. The remainder of this section presents an overview of the
electricity supply industries of France and Italy, Germany and
Sweden, Bolivia and the United States.
The electricity supply in France and Italy like the
one in Mexico is publicly owned with centralized control. Such
dominant utilities account for all the supply, production and
distribution of electrical power in their respective countries.
Germany and Sweden are examples of countries that
operate their electricity supply industries in a decentralized manner.
Both have a different types of power and mixed private and public
ownership.
"Germany's electricity industry is decentralized,
even though the degree of public ownership and influence is still
large. There are many electricity utilities ranging from large,
integrated systems engaged all activities to simple distribution
companies which buy in all their power." (Sykes and Robinson 1987).
Most of the power generation and distribution is provided by twelve
companies. Such companies are owned by both the private and public
sectors. Usually, the public sector has a majority stake in them. The
system is organized along regional lines and although there is
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frequent interchange of power between such regions, there is no
nationally coordinated transmission grid.
Local and federal government involvement is strong.
The regional governments (Lander) and local councils partly own and
regulate the industry in their regions. Regulation of the industry is
very light.
The system in Sweden is an intermediate step
between full public and full private ownership. Half of the electricity
is supplied by the state through the Vattenfall utility, 20 percent
comes from municipal utilities and the remaining 30 percent is
generated by the private sector. Vattenfall buys power from several
private generators and these generators can rent capacity on the
trunk line system which is then used as a common carrier. With this
scheme, the state retains control of most of the generating capacity,
the national grid and preserves the efficiencies of market systems.
Vattenfall as well as the other municipal utilities
are expected to be profitable (i.e. operate as private companies) and
to compete with the private sector. Since other companies have
access to the grid, there is a genuine market for power in Sweden.
Regulation is not directly applied but a mixture of competition and
cooperation keeps the prices low.
The US system is based on private regional
monopolies that are heavily regulated. About 85 percent of electrical
power is produced by privately owned monopolies. The utility
companies are subject to detailed state, county or municipal
regulations that cover every aspect of their operations. This system
has the advantage of limiting the monopoly powers while providing
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cheap and uninterrupted power, however, the tight regulations are
expensive to enforce, lead to many disputes and many times are
ineffective.
In Bolivia, the government supplies about 82
percent of the electrical power. The remaining 18 percent is supplied
by Compania Boliviana de Energia Electrica (CBEE). The Bolivian
government granted a concession to CBEE for the generation and
distribution of electricity in the La Paz region for forty years. In the
concession, capacity increases are mandated but it is up to CBEE to
implement such increases. The concession also permits CBEE to
receive a 9 percent return on its rate base (rate base is roughly equal
to the replacement cost of the generating assets minus the observed
depreciation).
The advantage of this system is that capacity
increases are financed by the private sector and if at any time the
private company breaches any part of the concession contract, the
government can immediately step in and take over the company.
Also, through the sale of concessions, the government can raise funds
for new projects. The disadvantage is that since some regions are
more profitable than others, the rates will not be uniform around the
country and some measure of subsidies will have to take place. Also,
companies can over invest in order to increase their rate base and
earn a larger return.
4.4 Conclusions
Even though the Mexican government has access to the
traditional methods of project financing, it is clear that it is missing
out on the financial opportunities that privatization brings. Not
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every form of privatization is adequate for Mexico and for an entity
such as CFE, therefore, it is imperative that an in depth analysis of
the choices and possibilities that the government faces be done before
any decision is made.
However, until that decision is made, several steps can be
taken in order to take advantage of the financial opportunities that
the private sector can bring. The first step should be to overturn the
laws against private generation and distribution of electricity so that
public-private partnerships that are more equally balanced can
emerge. Mexico should apply the experience it gained through the
Highway Development Program to the electricity supply industry so
that a better service with less interruptions and better prices becomes
available.
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5. ACTUAL FINANCIAL AND LEGAL STRUCTURES
5.1 Introduction
This chapter is divided in two parts. The first part
describes the actual financial structure that is being used for the
development of Huites project. The second part of the chapter deals
with the legal structure used.
It is necessary to note, however, that the final financial
structure is a result of several modifications to the original proposal.
The proposed structure called for a bond issue, in Europe, of 250
million US dollars. Such issue was to be guaranteed by lease
payments that CFE would make to CNA for the use of the dam for
electricity generating purposes. This scheme was not used because of
a law that forbids "Hell or High-water" clauses in lease contracts in
Mexico (such clauses force the lessee to make lease payments even if
the leased property is not completed on time or suffers damage).
Therefore, if the project was not completed on time, then CFE would
not have to make payments on its lease. To get around this issue, a
"support agreement" was written where Nacional Financiera (Nafin),
a governmental financial institution, would guarantee payment to the
note holders even if the project was not completed. The Mexican
government rejected this scheme because it would mean an increase
in public debt. The final scheme to be described in the following
section ended up causing an increase in public debt. However,
different institutions were used and some of the more complicated
issues such as the support agreement where avoided.
The legal structure rests on the key component which is
a fiduciary trust that was set up by the participants. The trust is a
76
direct application of the experience learned in the highway
development program. In this second section, the trust as well as the
other contracts used will be described.
The chapter ends with a section containing the
conclusions as well as some of the cash flows of the trust at the time
the work was being written.
5.2 Sources of Funds
In the following paragraphs, every source of funds for the
project will be described and analyzed, however, for a complete look
at the financial scheme as well as for quick reference, figure 5.1
shows a representation of the entire scheme.
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Summary of Financial Scheme
SOURCES
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Figure 5.1
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5.2.1 Contractor Investment
As part of the trust contract, the contractor,
Consorcio Mexicano Constructor de Huites (CMCH) had to invest the
sum of twenty million US dollars in the trust. This sum was invested
in June 1992 and according to the trust contract, will be returned to
CMCH six months after the project is accepted by CNA. The twenty
million dollars will be returned with a 10% annual fixed rate in US
dollars. The interest generated will be compounded quarterly during
the construction of the project.
The funds needed to return the investment to CMCH
will come from surplus cash remaining in the trust's treasury and in
case there isn't any, from the contributions made by CNA. Figure 5.2
describes the contractor's investment.
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Figure 5.2 CMCH Investment (US dollars)
Starting Balance
Annual Interest
Compounded
Starting Period
End of:
$20,000,000
10%
Quarterly
July 1, 1992.
Interest Earned
Project is finished
Amount returned to CMCH
Balance
Sep-92
Dec-92
Mar-93
Jun-93
Sep-93
Dec-93
Mar-94
Jun-94
Sep-94
Dec-94
Mar-95
Jun-95
500,000
512,500
525,313
538,445
551,906
565,704
579,847
594,343
609,201
624,431
640,042
656,043
20,500,000
21,012,500
21,537,813
22,076,258
22,628,164
23,193,868
23,773,715
24,368,058
24,977,259
25,601,691
26,241,733
26,897,776
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The twenty million dollar investment, along with
other funds, has been used to fund the construction of the project up
to the summer of 1993. In the previous figure, it is assumed that the
project will be completed by December 31, 1994.
5.2.2 CNA Contributions
The CNA is contributing funds to the project for
two main reasons. First, to provide funds for the repayment of loans
and credits and second, as a kind of subsidy to decrease the
leveraged amount and therefore, decrease the amount of interest
payments by the trust.
The contributions made by CNA are funds from the
federal government that will be spent on Huites project. Figure 5.3
describes the contributions made by CNA.
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Figure 5.3 Summary of CNA Contributions (US dollars x 1,000)
Month
Amount
Month
Amount
Month
Amount
Month
Amount
Month
Amount
Month
Amount
Month
Amount
Jul-92
0
Jan-93
8,700
Jul-93
827
J.an-94
0
Jul-94
37,000
Jan-95
951
Jul-95
0
Aug-92
0
Feb-93
0
Aug-93
0
Feb-94
0
Aug-94
0
Feb-95
11,217
Aug-95
24,899
Sep-92
0
Mar-93
1,624
Sep-93
0
Mar-94
0
Sep-94
15,000
Mar-95
0
Sep-95
0
Oct-92
0
Apr-93
6,333
Oct-93
9,930
Apr-94
0
Oct-94
0
Apr-95
0
Oct-95
0
Nov-92
0
May-93
5,078
Nov-93
9,930
May-94
0
Nov-94
0
May-95
0
Nov-95
0
Dec-92
16,239
Jun-93
650
Dec-93
9,930
Jun-94
0
Dec-94
0
Jun-95
0
Dec-95
0
Additional Contributions
Total CNA Contributions
Annual Total
16,239
53,002
52,000
37,067
646
158,954
Present Value of Contributions at 12% $129,655.00
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5.2.3 CFE Bridge Loans
The bridge loan provided by CFE to the Huites trust
totaled 50 million US dollars. Such loan was given for three months
at an interest rate equal to Libor plus three points. The funds from
the bridge loan were used for the construction at the start of the
project. The fifty million were already repaid to CFE by the time this
work was being written with funds obtained through the bond issue in
Europe.
5 2.4 Bond Issue
On August 5, 1992 the Huites trust issued 200
million dollars of debt through bonds in Europe. The following
paragraphs will describe in detail the bond issue.
The notes were issued in an aggregate principal
amount of US $200,000,000 and will mature at par on August 5,
2003. The notes will bear interest at 8% per year payable semi-
annually on February 5 and August 5 of each year. The issue price
was 99.80% of par value. Interest will be paid to the person in
whose name the note is registered at the close of business on the
preceding January 21 or July 21 as the case may be.
The notes will be "direct, general and unconditional
obligations of the Huites trust ranking pari passu, without any
preference among themselves, with all other unsecured and
unsubordinated obligations of the Huites trust (including the Export
Loans), present and future, relating to external indebtedness."
(Prospectus of notes). Noteholders do not have any recourse against
assets of the Huites trust but rather have the guaranty of Banco
Nacional de Comercio Exterior S.N.C. (Bancomext).
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The notes have the guaranty of Bancomext which is
a national credit institution and development bank of Mexico. The
Mexican government is responsible for the transactions entered into
by Bancomext. If on the dates of redemption of the notes the fiscal
agent has not received sufficient funds from the Huites trust to pay in
full the interest and/or principal of the notes, Bancomext will be
required to provide funds equal to the deficient amount to the fiscal
agent, Citibank, N.A. The notes are unconditionally and irrevocably
guaranteed by Bancomext. "The obligations of Bancomext under the
Guaranty will be direct, general and unconditional obligations of
Bancomext ranking pari passu, with all other unsecured and
unsubordinated obligations of Bancomext, present and future,
relating to external indebtedness." (Prospectus of notes).
At present, the Huites trust has filed for a tax
exemption status for the interest payments on the notes. Usually, a
15% tax is charged on any interest received. However, in case the
result of the file is negative, the trust and/or Bancomext will pay an
additional amount so that the noteholders receive an amount equal to
the amount received by them had no such taxes been required.
The noteholders may redeem the notes in whole, at
par plus accrued interest, if the organic law of Bancomext is
modified, Bancomext is merged with another institution and is not the
surviving entity or if the Mexican government ceases to be
responsible for the obligations of Bancomext.
Bancomext is subject to certain covenants in the
Guaranty of the notes. This covenants include a "Negative Pledge"
which means that Bancomext "will not create or permit to subsist any
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Security Interest in the whole or any part of its present or future
revenues or assets, including uncalled capital, to secure any of its
Public External Indebtedness, unless the notes are secured equally
and ratably with such Public External Indebtedness...". A covenant
of "Continuation of Activities" is noted as well as a "Consolidation,
Merger and Sale of Assets". Continuation of activities means that
Bancomext will continue to engage in activities of the same general
type as it does now. And the consolidation, merger and sale of assets
covenant means that Bancomext will not "consolidate with or merge
into any other person or convey, transfer or lease its properties and
assets substantially..." to any other entity. (Prospectus)
The notes are subscribed by Lehman Brothers
International (Europe), Bear, Sterns International Limited, Bankers
Trust International PLC, Banque Indosuez, Chase Investment Bank
Limited, Citibank International pie, Deutche Bank, AG London,
Goldman Sachs International Limited, Solomon Brothers International
Limited and Swiss Bank Corporation. The Huites trust agreed to pay
the subscribers a combined underwriting and management fee of .25%
of the aggregate principal amount of the notes.
The notes will be listed on the Luxembourg Stock
Exchange. The notes will be sold in offshore transactions through
Euroclear and Cedel and will be traded through PORTAL (Private
Offerings, Resales and Trading through Automated Linkages of the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.)
The notes were given a BBB rating by Standard and
Poor's. Bancomext had only one previous issue of securities which
were straight "Yankee Bonds". Such issue paid an interest equal to
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240 basis points above the 5 year Treasury Bond. In the case of the
Huites issue, the interest was defined by adding 232 basis points
above the 5 year Treasury Bond.
As will be described in the next section, the capital
needed to service the bond debt will come from two sources, the
contributions of CNA and the lease payments that CFE will make for
the use of the dam. However, since the notes are guaranteed by
Bancomext (i.e. the Mexican government) the noteholders are
indifferent about the source of funds for repayment.
Figure 5.4 describes the cash flow received by a
holder of one note.
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Figure 5.4 Cash Flow seen by the holder of one note.
Year Amount
1993 ($998)
1994 40
40
1995 40
40
1996 40
40
1997 40
40
1998 40
40
1999 40
40
2000 40
40
2001 40
40
2002 40
40
2003 40
1,040
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IRR Semi-annul 4.0147%
IRR Anualized 8.0295%
5.2.5 Electromechanical Equipment Credits
In order to understand the way the credits for the
procurement of the electromechanical equipment were structured, it
is necessary to point out that the supplier of the equipment is a
consortium led by Siemens of Germany. The members of the
consortium are Siemens A.G. (Germany), Siemens S.A. de C.V.
(Mexico), Siemens Sao Paulo S.A. (Brazil) and Energomachexport of
Russia. (together the consortium).
The credit for the procurement of the equipment is
made up of three credits; one given by Germany, another by Brazil
and finally, one by Russia.
The German credit was granted by KFW, a German
bank. The credit is for 112,397,750 German Marks (DM). This
credit is divided in two parts: 85% (95,538,088 DM) has the backing
of a German export import bank called Hermes and is to be repaid in
12 years with equal semiannual payments. Repayment of this part
will begin on June 30, 1995 or six months after the start of
operations of the project. The remaining 15% (16,859,662 DM) has
no German backing and will be given to Siemens as an advance
payment for the equipment. This part will be repaid in 5 years with
equal semiannual payments starting on June 30, 1995. The interest
charged on both parts is close to 10% annually.
The Russian credit was granted by a trading
company called Energomachexport. The credit is for 18,253,575 US
dollars and covers 100% of the value of the Russian equipment. This
credit will be repayed in 10 years with equal semiannual payments
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starting on June 30, 1995, and the interest rate charged is close to
7%.
Finally, the Brazilian part was granted by Banco
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social (Bandes). This
credit amounts to 85% of the value of the Brazilian equipment which
is 21,604,376 US dollars. Repayment will be in 9 years with equal
semiannual payments starting on June 30, 1995 or 18 months after the
first shipment. An annual interest rate of about 8.5% is being
charged. The remaining 15% of the value of the Brazilian equipment
will be financed through the capital raised by the bond issue.
All three separate credits are guaranteed, on the
part of the Huites trust, by Bancomext. Figure 5.5 shows a summary
description of the credits for the procurement of the
electromechanical equipment.
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Figure 5.5 Summary of Equipment Credits.
Germany Russia
Germany_ j j~",
//
Electromechanical i
Equipment
Credits
Brazil
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KFW
112,397,750 DM
..·
Energomachexport
$18,253,575 USD
Term = 10 years
Interest = 7%
BANDES
$21,604,376 USD
Term = 9 years
Interest = 8.5%
85%
HERMES
Backing
Term = 12 years
Interest = 10%
15%
Term = 5 years
Interest = 10%
5.3 Legal Structure
The legal structure that defines the relationships between
the parties involved in Huites consists of six contracts. These
contracts determine everything from the ownership of the assets to
the financial services received by advisors.
It is necessary to note that even though the credits
received and the debt issued by the fiduciary trust is guaranteed by
Bancomext, the legal structure outlines the means by which such
financial obligations are to be repaid. The following paragraphs
present summary descriptions of the contract that make up the
structure.
5.3.1 Fiduciary Trust Contract
The fiduciary trust contract takes place between
CMCH, Nacional Financiera S.N.C. (Nafin), CNA and CFE and it
consists of fifteen clauses.
In the first clause, the members of the trust are
defined. In the second, the objectives of the trust are enumerated.
Such aims are, first, that Nafin is entitled to receive and conserve in
escrow all the goods that make up the resources of the trust. As part
of this mandate, Nafin is responsible for all the legal proceedings
necessary for the completion of the project. All fees for this purpose
are to be charged to the trust.
Second, Nafin is entitled to receive the investment
made by CMCH, the contractor, and the contributions made by CNA.
Also, Nafin is responsible for the management of all the funds in the
trust including the investment of any liquid funds that are not
immediately required by the project.
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Next, It is Nafin's responsibility to contract for the
project builder and the suppliers of equipment. Nafin is also
responsible to engage in the lease agreement with CFE for the
generating assets of the project. The insurance policies, and legal,
financial, fiscal and accounting advisors are also contracted for by
Nafin.
Also as part of the second clause, Nafin is
responsible for applying the resources it receives from the lease with
CFE to the payment of the credits and other financial obligations of
the trust. Finally, Nafin has to transfer, free of any charge,
ownership of the generating plant to CFE after the lease expires and
ownership of the dam to CNA at the same time.
The third clause determines the assets of the trust
which include the investment from CMCH, contributions from CNA,
the funds raised through debt issues and credits received, the built
facilities, the electromechanical equipment and the lease payments
from CFE.
The fourth clause deals with the responsibilities of
CMCH during the construction of the project. Basically, CMCH is
responsible for all the non-liquid funds while construction is in
process. Also, CMCH is responsible for any damages to third parties
during the same period.
The fifth, sixth and seventh clauses deal with the
formation of a "Technical Committee" and with its responsibilities
and powers. In summary, the committee is made up of
representatives from each member of the trust and serves as the
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governing body in matters of investments, contracts, accounting,
payments, penalties and reports of the trust.
The last eight clauses deal with the legality and
duration of the trust and of its members as well as the fees that Nafin
is entitled to charge.
The fiduciary trust is the key element around which
all legal structure is formed. It is the body responsible for the
successful completion of the project. The use of this type of trust
was directly imported from the experience gained by the Mexican
government in the Highway Development Program of president
Salinas.
5.3.2 CNA Investment and Financial Support Agreement
The agreement defines the financial obligations of
CNA with the trust. Basically, CNA agrees to contribute a certain
amount to the trust to be used for the construction of Huites. The
agreement specifies that in case there are cost overruns due to
variations in the technical specifications or amounts of work, CNA is
responsible for the provision of the missing resources.
Under the agreement, it is CNA's responsibility to
provide the necessary funds to cover inflation escalations, and to
maintain the liquidity of the trust fund. In case the CNA is unable to
provide such funds, it is responsible for obtaining credits to cover its
obligations and for any interest charges resulting from the credits.
Finally, CNA is to assume all the financial
responsibilities of the trust if the project is suspended due to causes
attributable to it.
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5.3.3 CFE's Lease Agreement
CFE agrees to lease the 400 megawatt hydroelectric
power generation station to be located next to Huites dam and
together with the dam constituting Huites project (power station).
The lease defines CFE as the lessee and Nafin as the lessor (not in its
individual capacity but solely as trustee of Huites fiduciary trust) and
it specifies the following actions.
The lessee is responsible for prompt payment of the
rent. The lessee is also responsible for the operation and
maintenance as well as the replacement of any component of the
power station.
CFE is responsible to maintain both property
insurance and liability insurance under the lease. The lease currency
is Mexican pesos and the laws of Mexico govern the lease.
The scheduled payment dates are June 30 and December 30 of
each year starting on June 1995 and ending on December 2006. The
yearly payment schedule is as follows:
YEAR AMOUNT
(Millions of Dollars)
1995 69.3
1996 66.3
1997 63.3
1998 60.3
1999 57.3
2000 54.3
2001 51.3
2002 48.3
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2003 45.3
2004 42.3
2005 39.3
2006 36.3
5.3.4 Construction Contract
The construction contract took place between
CMCH as contractor and Nafin as trustee of Huites trust. In it,
CMCH agrees to undertake the construction of Huites project for a
predetermined amount and time. Nafin, through directions from CNA
reserves the right to change or modify the project as long as the
basic nature of the work is not altered and the economic
repercussions are resolved. The previous point also applies to
increases or decreases in the amount of work to be done.
Nafin is responsible to contract construction
supervisory services in order to review the progress on the
construction and the invoices filed by the contractor.
The contract is a lump sum type based, on unit
prices, with a predetermined time limit . The trust agreed to pay the
contractor a prepayment equal to 20% of the total value of the
construction and then pay for invoices presented by the contractor
according to construction progress. The contractor has to present
invoices on the 25th day of each month and after the acceptance of
both the supervisor and the CNA, the trust has to pay them.
The responsibilities of CMCH in this contract are
many. It has to guarantee its obligations to the trust through two
separate bonds, one equal to 100% of the value of the prepayment
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received and the other for 10% of the value of the total construction.
Also, CMCH is completely responsible for any subcontracts or
activities it engages with third parties for the construction of the
project. In case of delays or suspension of work attributable to the
contractor, a penalty of 1.5 million US dollars per month will be
charged by the trust up to a prespecified amount. In case the
suspension of work lasts for less than one month, $50,000 US dollars
per day will be charged.
On the other hand, when work on the project is
suspended by orders of CNA, the contractor is entitled to receive
payment for the work already completed plus the value of the non
amortized machinery and equipment at the time of the suspension. It
is necessary to note, however, that the contract defines certain cases
where suspension of the work is not attributable to any party (floods,
fires, war, etc.). In such cases, both parties are free from any
financial reparations to the other.
Finally, the contract specifies that both parties have
to submit to the jurisdiction of the Mexico City courts to resolve any
legal disputes.
5.3.5 Electromechanical Equipment Supply Contract
This contract takes place between Nafin as trustee
of Huites trust and the Siemens consortium aforementioned. The
contract is a "turn key" type and assigns the consortium the job of
designing, building, mounting, testing and begin operation of the
equipment and electromechanical systems that make up the power
station of Huites. Since this is a turn key project, Huites trust
expects the consortium to deliver a working power station for the
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dam, this includes everything from manufacturing the equipment and
special installations to the transportation and testing of the power
plant. The trust is responsible for the construction and timely
delivery of the equipment room to the consortium so that the power
station can be installed.
The contract specifies procedures for changes and
modifications of the work and makes the consortium responsible for
the supply of spare parts as well as for establishing a maintenance
program for the equipment.
Siemens consortium is responsible for the
instruction and training of personnel provided by CFE on the
operation and maintenance of the power station. With such training,
all the pertinent operation and maintenance instruction manuals have
to be provided.
The consortium is responsible for the safety and
upkeep of all the equipment up to the delivery and acceptance of such
by the trust. Also, the consortium is responsible for any damage
caused by its activities to the trust or to third parties and is
compelled to have the necessary insurance to cover property and
liability damage.
Finally, it is the responsibility of the consortium to
obtain all the necessary permits and licenses as well as a bond that
guarantees its work. Both parties submit to the jurisdiction of the
Mexico City courts for dispute resolutions.
5.3.6 Financial Services Contract
The financial services contract takes place between
CMCH and Grupo Serficor S.A. de C.V., N.M. Rothchild and Sons
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Limited and Internacional de Servicios Financieros (together the
advisors). In this contract, CMCH assign the duties of economic and
financial evaluation of Huites project as well as the design,
instrumentation, and promotion of the financial scheme for the
development of Huites.
The advisors act as coordinators for obtaining
credits and issuing securities on the domestic as well as international
financial markets. They are responsible for obtaining funds under the
best possible terms in the markets at the time.
CMCH agrees to pay comissions to the advisors for
the services rendered. All comissions are to be split in three equal
parts between the advisors. The comissions are 1% of the long term
credits (at least ten years) destined for the project except credits by
cement companies and other materials suppliers, eximbanks and
contributions by the government or the contractors themselves. Such
comissions are not to exceed 3 million US dollars. CMCH will also
pay for expenses incurred by the advisors up to 50,000 US dollars.
The comissions described above do not include comissions charged by
other financial and stock market intermediaries.
CMCH can terminate, without responsibility, the
contract if within one year of the date it was signed, the advisor's
officers are replaced or lose control of their respective companies.
CMCH is also bound to contract financial services exclusively with
the advisors. Figure 5.6 shows a summary of the legal structure.
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Figure 5.6 Summary of the Legal Structure
Lease Agreement
I HUITES
FIDUCIARY
TRUST
Nafin CFE
CNA CMCH
/
/Construction
Contract
.... CFE
Investment and Financial
Support Agreement
Electromechanical Equipment
Supply Contract
Financial Services Contract
99
CNA
CMCH
_--
SIEMENS
CONSORTIUM
FINANCIAL
ADVISORS
ISEFI
SERFICOR
ROTHCHILD
..
I
i
\X
5.4 Conclusions
It is clear from the above description of the financial and
legal structures that the burden of the risk falls on the government's
shoulders through CNA and Bancomext. Basically, the risk that the
private sector faces is limited to the 20 million dollar investment on
the project. However, the private sector (CMCH) also faces the risks
that are common to any large construction project. CMCH will
invest in the course of the construction, large sums on equipment and
temporary personnel. The investment made by CMCH can become a
bad deal if the construction is faulty or falls behind schedule.
Even though the Mexican government had the intention of
financing Huites through a larger if not total private sector stake, it
ended up accepting almost all the risk by giving guarantees to both
the debt issue and the electromechanical equipment credits. The
original scheme that called for the lease payments from CFE to the
trust along with the CNA contributions to back up all the credits was
unacceptable to investors who refused to take on "project" risks.
This situation was compounded when a "Hell or High-water" clause in
the lease was found to be illegal. Since the construction companies
were unable or unwilling to guarantee the debt issue and equipment
credits, the only choice left was for the government to take on the
risk.
The legal structure reflects the philosophy that the
Mexican government has used ever since the highway program. This
type of structure is an efficient and clear way to reflect public-
private partnerships.
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It is necessary to note that this chapter was written
almost in "real time". For example, the bond issue was made on
August 5, 1993. Therefore, some contracts and/or credits may still
suffer some changes after the thesis is completed. This chapter
describes the schemes used as they were on August 1993 and may not
be the final ones. Figure 5.7 shows a summary of all the cash flows
seen by the trust.
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Figure 5.7 Summary Cash Flow of Huites Trust
Special Contribution by CFE
CNA Contribution
Contractor Investmert
Credit for Fixed Assets
CFE Lease Payments
Interest Gains (Losses)
VAT Tax Reirbursement
Revolving Credits
TOTAL INFLOW
Bancomext Fund
Construction Payments
Inport Taxes
Supervision and Qualty Control
Adrninistration and Insurance
Financial Cost **
Payment of Principal
VAT of Construction
Repayment of Revolving Credit
Repayment of Contractors Investment
TOTAL OUTFLOW
RESULTNG FLOW
Construction Period
0
121,239,000
19,258,000
383,198,000
0
4,861,000
49,705,000
68,684,000
646,945,000
0
462,931,000
14,337,000
19,200,000
5,047,000
44,380,000
0
50,651,000
50,000,000
0
646,546,000
399,000
Lease Period
20,000,000
37,714,000
0
0
654,700,000
16,230,000
1,966,000
0
730,610,000
(24,024,000)
0
0
0
10,415,000
269,647,000
383,198,000
1,041,000
18,684,000
25,900,000
684,861,000
45,749,000
Total
20,000,000
158,953,000
19,258,000
383,198,000
654,700,000
21,091,000
51,671,000
68,684,000
1,377,555,000
(24,024,000)
462,931,000
14,337,000
19,200,000
15,462,000
314,027,000
383,198,000
51,692,000
68,684,000
25,900,000
1,331,407,000
46,148,000
* * Iterrized Financial Cost:
Bancomext Conrissions 2,075,000 0 2,075,000
Other Cormiissions 6,385,000 18,544,000 24,929,000
Interest in Dollars 30,147,000 251,104,000 281,251,000
Interest in Pesos 773,000 0 773,000
Financial Engineering | 5,000,000 0 5,000,000
Total 44,380,000 269,648,000 314,028,000
Note: Figures are in US Dollars.
102
6. Conclusions
After a decade of heavy borrowing and a failed strategy of oil
revenue reliance, the Mexican economic situation was in a deep crisis
which made the country unattractive to foreign investment and which
placed the construction industry in a terrible recession. It took all
the mandate of president Miguel de la Madrid to stabilize the
economy and lower inflation rates enough to begin thinking about
infrastructure development. When president Salinas took office in
1988, he introduced order in the government's finances, renegotiated
Mexico's external debt and privatized the majority of the state run
enterprises including the financial sector. These changes made
Mexico an attractive country for foreign investment and renewed the
confidence of the country's private sector.
Once confidence was restored, and after enjoying successful
results in privatizing Mexico's banks, the government of Mr. Salinas
set forth an amb.itious plan to modernize the country's highway
network. The plan called for heavy private sector participation and
the different contracts were awarded using public-private
partnerships. Valuable experience was gained both in setting up and
managing these partnerships as well as in build-operate-transfer types
of contracts. The main challenge the government faced was to apply
the newly gained experience to other types of infrastructure projects
besides highways and since much of the financial capacity of the
construction firms was tied up in the highway program, to tap the
international capital markets to finance future projects.
Huites hydroelectric dam had been in the drawing table for
more than six years. The benefits such project would bring were
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clear both in terms of increased agricultural production, additional
electricity generating capacity and increased flood control capability
for the northwestern region of the country. However, an
economically feasible scheme for the construction of the project had
not been achieved and the project was put on hold.
Huites became the perfect project to test the exportability of
the lessons learned from the highway development program after the
idea of leasing the power station of the project to CFE, the state run
electricity company, was introduced. The intention was to finance
the project with private credits guaranteed by future lease payments
from CFE. The project required large amounts of resources and was
complex both in a technical and financial sense. The challenge was
to complete such large and elaborate project in a very short time so
that it could be finished before the end of the presidential term in
1994.
The project was then put up for public bids and the winner of
the licitation was a consortium of four construction firms, three
Mexican and one Brazilian. A new and interesting challenge arose
from this result. Not only was the project complicated enough but
now problems of coordination, organization and ability to respond
rapidly had to be dealt with.
The winning consortium decided to form a new company called
"Consorcio Mexicano Constructor de Huites" (CMCH) to deal with
the above challenges. Positions on the company were divided
between the four firms and several committees were formed such as
the financial and executive committee to oversee the operations of
CMCH. Employees of CMCH (made up of personnel from the four
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firms) adapted surprisingly well to their new employer putting aside
mistrust after years of competing with each other and showing loyalty
to the new company. CMCH developed a character of its own
integrating the best from each of the founding firms.
After it was discovered that CFE could not include a "Hell or
High-water" clause in its lease agreement, it became clear that some
sort of guaranty from the Mexican government was going to be
needed to back up both a planned bond issue in Europe and credits
for the procurement of the electromechanical equipment for the
power station. After months of negotiations and changes to the
original scheme, a state development bank called Bancomext provided
the necessary guarantees. From this situation, two interesting
conclusions can be drawn.
First, the Mexican government had no other option than to
assume most of the risk of the project. This situation occurred
because there is no private market for electricity in Mexico. If
Mexico develops a private market for electricity in which long term
contracts for the supply of power are possible and users can be easily
identified, the government would have a much broader spectrum of
financial opportunities to fund projects such as Huites. However, to
develop a private market, the state run monopoly on electricity would
have to be privatized in some form. Several alternatives for the
privatization of CFE are possible and it is clear from the experiences
of other nations that some work better than others. Whatever the
option chosen, it is imperative that the government guarantees
uninterrupted supply of energy without loosing control of such a
strategic resource to foreign participants. Also, maximum
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competition should be allowed while maintaining an efficient industry
in order to reap the benefits that competition brings such as higher
productivity, lower costs, higher quality of service and lower prices
to the consumers.
Second, the lesson for the Mexican government is that instead
of finding creative financing techniques on a project by project basis,
it should concentrate on establishing a trustworthy system of laws
and regulations where foreign investors feel secure and protected by
the contracts they sign. If such a situation would occur in the United
States, the capital needed to complete the project could probably be
raised with only the twenty million dollars put up as equity by the
contractors. Investors would not demand government guarantees to
buy securities that include project risks.
The financial scheme that resulted after many changes reflects
the government's acceptance of the majority of the risk. The scheme
consists of a bond issue in Europe, credits for the procurement of the
electromechanical equipment, investments by the contractor,
contributions by the CNA and bridge loans from CFE to begin
construction. The private sector has a risk of a loss or bad
investment of its contribution plus the risks that are associated to
any major construction project such as machinery investments. Since
the contractor is responsible for the project while the construction is
in process, it runs the risk of falling behind schedule (causing harsh
penalties). Also, since the contractor has the freedom of
subcontracting any part of the job it is also responsible for any
adverse outcome from this practice such as bad quality and
incomplete or abandoned jobs. Nevertheless, once construction is
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finished and the project is accepted by the Mexican authorities, the
contractor withdraws from the trust and from any financial obligation
of it. Since the contractor is a consortium made up of four large,
competent and experienced construction firms (otherwise the
government would not have awarded the contract to them) it is
reasonable to assume that the job will be finished within a reasonable
time and quality standards. Therefore, the private risk in the Huites
project is minimal compared with the risk absorbed by the
government. It is sound to conclude that even though Huites is a
form of public-private partnerships it is a lob sided one in financial
terms. The partnership did, however, exploit the private sector's
ability to engineer complex financial schemes and negotiate the best
possible credit terms. The result of this was the development of a
large infrastructure project with minimal fiscal funds. One other
important benefit from the partnership is that if the project is
finished on time, suffers no major delays or damage and CFE makes
the lease payments as planned (which is highly probable), then the
Mexican government does not have to use the guarantees given to the
note holders and credit institutions and therefore, no additional debt
is shown on the government's accounts.
The legal structure arrived at was the result of applying the
lessons from previous experience in the highway development
program. The structure is centered around a fiduciary trust of which
CNA, CMCH, CFE and Nafin are part. The trust provides an entity
with which all third parties deal and therefore provides an efficient
coordination and information mechanism. Also, the trust provides a
body for dispute resolution without having to resort to the judicial
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system. The contracts described in the second part of chapter five
are intended to give a general idea of the structure and to describe
the nature of the relationships between the participants. The
contracts are, of course, very thorough in specifying the relationships
as completely as possible to avoid any misunderstandings or adverse
situation between the parties. It is not the central objective of this
document to analyze such relationships in complete detail.
Clearly, many important lessons are to be learned from Huites,
especially the privatization issue. It is in the hands of both the
government and the private sector to search for alternate financial
opportunities in order to continue the development of infrastructure
in a country where external debt remains high and internal resources
are limited compared to industrialized nations.
Finally, it is important to note that many of the contracts,
agreements and credits are probably going to suffer some more
modifications before the end of the project. However, this document
describes the situation as faithfully as possible under the prevailing
circumstances and at the present time.
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